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1Abstract
The paper examines the eﬀect that institutions have on Total Factor Productivity
(TFP) growth. This is done by creating a TFP gap between the leader and each of
the following countries. The global leaders used are the USA and an average of OECD
members. The coeﬃcient on the gap measures each country’s ability to learn or absorb
new technology from the more advanced leader. The results show that institutions do
not seem to have as signiﬁcant a role in TFP growth as other literature has suggested.
The most inﬂuential variables are country-speciﬁc factors: this would indicate that a
one size ﬁts all model will not help developing nations to catchup. When institution
variables were added to the model they manage to only explain 31 per cent of TFP
diﬀerence. This implies that there is still a large portion of TFP growth that is random
and not explicable using current economic models.1 Introduction
Much of the recent literature on economic growth has discussed the impact that institu-
tions can have on economic eﬃciency. For instance, Hall and Jones (1999) and Acemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson (2001) have emphasised institutional diﬀerences as perhaps the key
factors explaining why some countries are rich while others are poor. The existing lit-
erature, however, contains very little evidence on the exact form of the linkages between
institutions and improvements in eﬃciency. This paper addresses this issue by examining
the relationships between growth in Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and various measures
of institutions in a large cross-country panel dataset.
One channel through which institutions are likely to aﬀect TFP growth is through their
inﬂuence on a country’s ability to absorb or adapt superior technologies in use elsewhere.
That the ability to adapt technologies may play a key role in determining a country’s
position in the world income distribution has been emphasised in various theoretical analysis
based on learning models such as Bernard and Jones (1996) and Acemoglu (2008). This
paper provides a ﬁrst empirical assessment of the role that institutions play in aﬀecting
economic growth through this learning channel. It also examines the extent to which
institutions inﬂuence those components of TFP growth that are unrelated to learning.
The key ﬁndings in the paper are that there is some evidence that TFP in poorer coun-
tries tends to catchup with TFP in the leading countries, i.e. there is some evidence for
unconditional catching up. In addition, we ﬁnd evidence that institutions have an eﬀect on
TFP growth, both through their eﬀects on the speed of learning and also through direct
eﬀects. That said, the empirical ﬁts produced by these models are relatively poor. In
addition, we ﬁnd that country-speciﬁc intercept terms—random unexplained diﬀerences in
growth across countries—explain far more of the variation in TFP growth than do insti-
tutional variables. This ﬁnding of a limited role for institutions may be a function of the
weakness of the institutional proxies used here. However, the paper uses a far wider and
more comprehensive set of institutional variables than previous studies, building on recent
work in studies such as Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) and Djankov et al (2002).
The contents of this paper are as follows. Section 2 outlines the model used in the
analysis. Section 3 describes the methodology and data. Section 4 presents the results.
Finally section 5 is the conclusion and summary.
12 Model
2.1 Model Assumptions
The model used in this paper is a standard model of technology transfer. There are a
number of variations of this type of model. Nelson and Phelps’s (1966) model looks at the
eﬀect that educated people have on innovation, and how education can speed the process of
technology diﬀusion. Bernard and Jones’s (1996) version of model is based on technology
diﬀusion in the manufacturing sector of the USA. The model we use in this paper is a
slightly diﬀerent version of the model presented in Acemoglu (2008).
This version of the model examines the gap in technology growth levels in countries
across the world. It is assumed that there is a lead country and all other countries follow
the leader. The leader has technology level, A, which grows at rate g. All other countries
have technology levels Bit, where Bit < At. The model assumes that the lead country’s
technology growth rate is exogenous while the following countries’ technology growth is
endogenous. In continuous time these technology levels grow at a rate of:
˙ Bi(t) = λi (A(t) − Bi(t)) (1)
where (A(t) − Bi(t)) is the technology or productivity gap between the lead country and
the follower. The parameter λi measures the fraction of the gap that can be closed due
to country i′s convergence speed through absorbing knowledge and new technology from
the advanced country. The larger the gap the more the following country has to learn and
therefore the more convergence needed.
2.2 Steady State Solution
In the steady state solution of this model, technology in all countries grows at the same







































The following country always has technology levels less then the leader and can only ex-
perience growth in technology if there is a gap between their level of technology and the
leaders. That is, as long as the lead country grows at rate g, the followers can acquire new
technologies from them. Therefore in the steady state they must have lower technology
levels than the leader.
2.3 Convergence to the Steady State Path
By solving equation (1) it can be shown that the steady state equilibrium is relevant if
convergence occurs. It is expressed below with all Bi(t) terms on the left hand side
˙ Bi(t) + λiBi(t) = λiA(t) (8)
Given that
˙ A(t)
A(t) = g, its particular solution is A(t) = A(0)egt therefore the diﬀerential
equation can be re-written in the form
˙ Bi(t) + λiBi(t) = λiA(0)egt (9)
One possible solution for a Bi(t) process that will satisfy this equation which is in the form
D1egt where D1 is some unknown coeﬃcient. It must satisfy the following equation
gD1egt + λiD1egt = λiA(0)egt (10)
Canceling the egt terms, gives






so this is solution corresponds exactly to the steady-state path in which all countries have











Now note that we a solution of the form
Bi(t) = B1
i (t) + B2
i (t)
has the property that
˙ Bi(t) = ˙ B1
i (t) + ˙ B2
i (t) (14)
So, a combined solution of this form will still satisfy equation (8) as long as
˙ B2
i (t) + λi ˙ B2
i (t) = 0 (15)
Which solves as
B2
i (t) = D2e−λt (16)









At + D2e−λt (18)
Given that e−λit tends toward zero as time goes on, the solution converges to the ﬁrst term,
which is growing at rate g, as required in the steady state.
This shows that even if there is TFP growth in poor countries and they close some
of the gap with rich countries they will never actually catch-up because λi
g+λi is less then
one. The leader will always be growing at rate g, this implies that the follower will always
have technology levels below that of the leader. The model also shows that it is not the
countries’ ability to invent new capital goods that is the key to growth but instead their
ability to absorb and learn technology from advanced countries. Therefore, the higher the
absorption speed of the follower countries, the faster they will converge on the leader.
42.4 Determinants of λ
The model also makes predictions about the relationship between the rates of technological
convergence, λi, and the country’s places in the long-run world income distribution. The
faster the speed of learning the higher the country’s long run level of income. If a country
can increase its λi via education or science related policies its position in the steady state
distribution of income may move upwards with the economy then going through a phase of
rapid growth.
The next issue to address is what causes diﬀerences in TFP across countries? And
what drives the pace of technological convergence in poorer countries? Hall and Jones
(1999), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) and Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes
and Shleifer (2004) are among many that address these issues. They all seem to agree that
institutional and social infrastructure are the keys to explaining productivity and growth
diﬀerences across countries.
3 Methodology and Data
3.1 Total Factor Productivity (TFP)
Using the absorption and convergence models discussed above this paper examines the con-
vergence speeds of technology growth. The TFP gap is the diﬀerence between the leader’s
TFP growth and the follower’s, rather then the steady state diﬀerence above. It is deter-
mined by calculating TFP for each country over time using Hall and Jones decomposition
of output per worker. This is done using the Cobb-Douglas production function:
Yi = Kα
i (AiHi)1−α (19)
where α is a production function parameter, which is equal to the share of capital income
in national output. Hi is human capital, which is used rather then labour. It is derived as
Hi = eφEiLi (20)
Hall and Jones assume that Li is homogeneous within a country and that each unit of
labour has been trained with Ei years of schooling. This paper uses the Barro-Lee tables
of average years of schooling for this variable E in the estimations. In this speciﬁcation the
function of φE reﬂects the eﬃciency of a unit of labour with E years of schooling relative
to one with no schooling.





where ki ≡ K/Y is the capital-output ratio, y ≡ Y/L is output per worker and h ≡ H/L is








Figure 1 shows the eﬀect of accounting for human capital on TFP. The broken lines
show that the TFP or the residual is lower when hi is used instead of Li given that more
of the output per worker has been explained.
In these calculations the standard value of α = 1/3 is used, as done in Hall and Jones
(1999) and McQuinn and Whelan (2007). However the results where similar when alterna-
tive values, such as α = 0.4 were used, as done in Easterly and Levine (2001).
Table 1 shows the output per worker ratios to the leader, for a selection of countries.
The leader is the USA and it covers the entire sample. It is split into high, middle and low
income countries and shows that output per worker has been catching up in some countries
e.g. Ireland, Hong Kong and China. It also shows that some countries such as Italy, Mexico,
Argentina, Japan and Kenya started to converge in the 1970s and 1980s but then diverged
again in the 1990s. These countries are compared to the USA values in the same year,
therefore USA growth needs to be considered. Over the sample the US experienced output
per worker growth of 1.4 percent per year. This implies that when a country converged
with the US during this period, output per worker needed to be growing in excess of 1.4
percent.
Tables 2 and 3 show the break-down of the productivity calculations for 2000 as ratios
to the USA. The 58 countries are divided up into regional groupings: Europe, Austral-
Asia, the Americas and Africa and the Middle East. It can be seen that in the more
developed countries, TFP contributes more to their output per worker growth-rates then
in less developed countries. This would imply that developed countries invest suﬃciently
in labour and capital, and that their growth comes from how productively and eﬃciently
this investment is used.
Hall and Jones concluded that diﬀerences in productivity (A or TFP) play a key role
in the generation of output per worker diﬀerences across countries. They ﬁnd that their
6measure of productivity is highly correlated with human capital accumulation and moder-
ately correlated with the capital-output ratio. It is from this perspective that we examine
what really aﬀects productivity and explore what merit there is in learning-type models
explaining the diﬀerences across countries.
3.2 Creation of K, I and δ
The main source of data for this paper is the Penn World Tables, from which we draw 58
countries over 41 years (1960-2000). The country selection was based on availability of the
institutions data and the Barro-Lee tables. Analysis is restricted to 2000 because average
years of school is a vital part of the model and the Barro-Lee tables are only available
between 1960-2000. The ﬁrst variable that had to be calculated was capital as it is not a
primary data source in the Penn World Tables. Before it could be generated assumptions
needed to be made regarding depreciation and initial conditions. The depreciation assump-
tions (δ) follow those of McQuinn and Whelan (2007b). They claim that depreciation is
around six per cent per annum. They come to this conclusion by assuming that there are







where St is physical structures and Et is equipment. They show that this equation can
only be obtained in this case if the weights used to calculate the “aggregate depreciation





this example. Empirical calculations from Whelan (2003) report Cobb-Douglas exponents
of 0.145 for equipment and 0.165 for physical structures, where value weights points to
physical structures being more important. An equally weighted average of a two percent
structures depreciation rate and a ten percent equipment depreciation rate points to an
overall depreciation rate of six percent.
Given the assumed depreciation rate the time series for capital stock (K) can be created
using the perpetual inventory method below.
Kt = Kt−1 (1 − δ) + It−1 (24)
The problem is that initial capital, Kt−1, cannot be observed. To deal with this issue we
follow the calculation from McQuinn and Whelan (2007b). They estimate the initial capital















Kt−1 is the average growth rate of investment over a ten year period. It is used
as a proxy for the growth rate of capital. When they tested this method they found that
their estimated capital stock for 2000 had a correlation of 0.99 with later series that were
almost completely based on data rather then the initial assumptions. In this paper the ﬁrst
available ten years are used. Once this initial value has been generated it was entered into
equation 25, which then determined the entire series of capital stock. See Appendix 1A-1D
for a full list of the variables and countries used in this paper.
3.3 Institution Variables
This section describes the various institutions indicators used in the analysis. The data was
obtained from Andrei Shleifer’s web site. It was downloaded as cross sections, combined
and then made into a panel. Some of the variables do not change over time, and the ones
that do are not year on year changes but 5 and 10 year averages. However, this is not
necessarily a problem given that institutional change can take a long time to implement
and even longer before eﬀects are seen. Also when these variables are interacted with the
gap which do change over time they then become time varying indicators.
As the construction of TFP is based on average years of schooling the data set was re-
stricted to countries that were available in the Barro-Lee tables. This variable also restricts
the years of the data set to 1960-2000.
The data set is then sub-divided into groupings that give general indications of the
inﬂuence of institutions in any given country. The six groupings are indicators of the coun-
try’s commitment to development and change. These are Political Government Variables,
Citizens Rights, Health Beneﬁts, Social Security Beneﬁts and Labour Regulations. Most of
these indicators are inter-related and correlated. This is to be expected as a country with
good government policy will tend to have good social, health and education standards also.
The Social Beneﬁts variables are all taken from Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-De-
Silanes and Shleifer (2004). This paper examines the eﬀects of social security, industrial
8and labour laws on labour force participation rates. The measures we use are: labour union
power, collective disputes, the availability of alternative employment, social security pro-
vided by the state, employer requirements, unemployment, old age and maternity beneﬁts.
The purpose of this group is to determine the eﬀects of unions and social policies of the
state.
The Health Beneﬁts are a combination of health indicators taken from Boterov, Djankov,
La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (2004), Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and
Shleifer (2002) and Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (2004). These combine
the responsiveness of the health services, sick beneﬁts from the state, risk of malaria and
the ISO environmental and quality standards.
Labour Regulations are made up of the cost of overtime, ﬁring costs, labour force par-
ticipation, minimum wage and age requirements, and legal requirements placed on the
employers. These are all taken from Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and
Shleifer (2004) and are essentially the labour laws that are used in their paper.
The Citizen Rights group is a more general grouping of the basic right of citizens. These
are taken from Boterov, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (2004), Djankov,
La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) and Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes
and Shleifer (2004). It is composed of expropriation risk, civil rights, corruption levels in
the government, court formalisation and property rights.
Political Government measures are taken from Boterov, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-De-
Silanes and Shleifer (2004) and Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (2004). It
measures the quality of the country’s government, and consists of the division of the gov-
ernment, legislature process competition, government eﬀectiveness, executive constraints
and levels of democracy.
School enrollment measures secondary level school participation. It is taken from the
World Bank Indicators as a proxy for the role of education in a country. The skills gained
from this education has already been accounted for in the human capital ratio derived above.
A more complete description of the institutions variables is given in appendix 1B-1D.
3.4 Creating the Rankings
The variables within each of the institutional groups are highly correlated with each other.
This multicollinearity problem implies that the coeﬃcient of the variables will not be very
9reliable as they will be prone to changes as other variables are added or withdrawn from
the regression. In order to over come this problem a Borda ranking system was used.
The Borda Count was ﬁrst developed by Jean-Charles Chevalier de Borda in 1770. It is an
electoral scheme that provides a method to rank-order scoring. This type of ranking system
has been used by economists such as Amartya Sen (1977) and Partha Dasgupta (1993) to
analyse social choice and well-being respectively.
The Borda rank was created by ranking each country’s score for a particular variable
within the institutional groupings relative to the other countries in the study. In other
words the best performing country in a particular category will obtain a score of 1 and the
worst performing country gets a score of 58. This process is repeated for every variable in
each group.
Once all the variable rankings are obtained, it is then necessary to sum the ranks for
each institutional grouping. This provides us with one number for each of the institutional
groups, it indicates their eﬀectiveness in a particular country relative to the other countries
in the study. The sum of the ranks contains the essential information given by the original
variables without imposing any serial correlation problems for our modeling.
3.5 Regression Speciﬁcations
There are six diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the model tested in this section. They all represent
variations of the learning model and the eﬀect of institutions on TFP growth. The sample
leaders used are the USA and an average of OECD members, i.e. all countries in the sample
learn from these two leaders. While the USA does not always have the highest absolute
TFP levels, it is still used as the global leader because it has managed to maintain consistent
output per worker growth for much longer periods then any other country.
Given that unconditional convergence is low and not all countries will converge on the
USA or even on the OECD average the sample is broken into regions which have their
own local leaders. The regions are Austral-Asia, Europe, The Americas and the rest of
world which is made up of Africa and the Middle East(see Appendix 1A for details). In
the regions there is no one leader for the entire sample in any of the regions, the leaders
change sporadically depending on who has the highest TFP levels in any given year. This
incorporates the random disturbance term, ǫi(t), which allows the leader to change. The
entire sample is then estimated allowing each country to learn from its regional leader,
without causing sampling errors but running each of the regions separately.
10The regression speciﬁcations will be discussed in discrete time as that is the format of
the data. The ﬁrst regression tests the pure learning eﬀect on TFP growth as described
in equation (1). This is done by using the technology gap between each country and the
leader:













The fraction of the gap that is closed each year is measured by the parameter λi. Each
country’s convergence speed is due to their ability to absorb and implement new technology
and knowledge from the lead country. The error term is ǫit. The gap can be lagged because
the following country can only acquire technology from the previous periods. This is to
incorporate R&D patents in the advanced country.
The rest of the regressions include institutions; the purpose of this is to determine the
direct and indirect eﬀects that institutions have on TFP growth. For example, if a following
country were to implement a new health system, that was learned about from the leader,
there would be two diﬀerent channels of inﬂuence. The direct eﬀect is the beneﬁt of the
new system itself, while the indirect eﬀect measures how much the gap is reduced and how
much convergence occurred through learning and implanting this new system.
The second regression tests the indirect eﬀect of institutions on TFP growth through the
gap. The eﬀect on the gap is measured by creating interaction variables, i.e. multiplying
institutions by the gap. This test measures whether or not the institutions matter for
learning speeds and convergence.






INSTit ∗ ˆ GAPit
￿
+ ǫit (29)
where INST is a combination of institution indicators that measure government, citizens
rights, trade, health, social and labour behaviour in a country. In this case λi becomes a
function of the gap and the interaction variables.
λi = (β1 + β2 ∗ INSTit) (30)
The lower the λi the more slowly the country converges toward the leader of a given gap.
This implies that the indirect eﬀect of institutions should be negative, because if they are
11reducing the gap they are creating convergence; where λi determines the speed of that
convergence.
The third regression includes country speciﬁc factors as well as the indirect institution
eﬀect. This is to determine how much TFP growth should be assigned to country speciﬁc
factors that can not be measured. The purpose of this regression is to determine if the
diﬀerence in global TFP growth is based on domestic diﬀerences or if they explained by
learning alone.






INSTit ∗ ˆ GAPit
￿
+ β3 (DUMMYi) + ǫit (31)
It is important to return to the direct eﬀect that institutions have on TFP growth as
new policies and systems can have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on society. The fourth regression
tests this direct eﬀect, independently of the gap:




+ β2 (INSTit) + ǫit (32)
The ﬁfth regression examines the combined direct and indirect eﬀects of institutions
on TFP growth. If they are not correlated the eﬀect should be the sum of the direct and
indirect eﬀect. This will not be the case as there is correlation between the variables and
this makes it diﬃcult to attribute deﬁnite eﬀects.






INSTit ∗ ˆ GAPit
￿
+ β3 (INSTit) + ǫit (33)
To compensate for this correlation, joint signiﬁcance tests are run to determine if all of the
variables are signiﬁcant as a group rather then just looking at the individual institution’s
eﬀects.
Given that both the direct and indirect eﬀects are potentially aﬀected by county speciﬁc
factors it is important to test for this eﬀect independently of other factors. The ﬁnal
regression therefore tests for the county speciﬁc eﬀect on its own:




+ β2 (DUMMYi) + ǫit (34)
This will given an indication of how much TFP growth is due to internal factors in each
country. These are things that would be diﬃcult to replicate. While this paper does not
analyse any country speciﬁcally we can use Ireland as an example to explain the intuition
behind this regression.
12It is unlikely that other countries will be able to have the same growth rates for as long
as Ireland because there were so many things that created its TFP growth. There were
demographic changes, returns on previous investment in education, joining the European
Unions and attracting large quantities of FDI etc. All of these factors could be replicated
but the chances of them all coming together at the same time and having the same eﬀect
in another country is very slim. So how much of the Celtic Tiger was due to luck, do-
mestic circumstance or implementation of better institutions? This paper will attempt to
determine these answers at a global rather then country level.
4 Results
4.1 Summary Statistics
This section examines the relationship between the institution variables and the gap in
TFP compared to the leader. The two global leaders used in this paper are the USA
and an average of OECD member’s TFP. Regional leaders changed over the course of the
sample so there is no speciﬁc leader for any given region. This allows the leader in each
respective region to change with all local countries learning from that years local leader.
The coeﬃcient of the TFP gap is λ, it measure the fraction of the gap that is closed each
year due to learning. It is therefore also the convergence speed for the following country
over the entire sample.
Figure 2 shows a selection of TFP gaps with the USA and how they have changed
over time. The Developed countries used are Canada, Finland, Ireland and the UK. Since
the 1980’s, Canada and Finland seem to have become less productive in relation to the
USA. Ireland became more productive in the 1990’s, while the UK has been performing
constantly better than the USA since the early 1970’s. The speed at which these countries
closed this gap, λ, was approximately 0.04 over the course of the sample.
The absolute gap between the Latin American countries and the USA has also been
small but there is some evidence of divergence since the early 1980’s. This panel indicates
that Argentina and Mexico were both more productive then the USA until the mid 1980’s.
That is, they were more eﬃcient in their use of resources. However, after 1980 they began
to lose this relative eﬃciency. In other words, Latin America was not able to increase
its productivity levels as rapidly as the USA. Argentina and Brazil convergence speeds are
0.11 and 0.10 respectively, with Chile and Mexico at 0.06 and 0.03. However, these learning
13speeds do not appear to have had the expected theoretical eﬀects of catch-up.
The size of the absolute gaps in Asia and Africa are quite similar and much larger
then Latin America and the developed countries. In Asia a large portion of that gap has
been closed in recent years. China for example has halved its gap with the USA, with the
rest of Asia increasing their productivity levels by about 0.5. India, China and Korea had
convergence speeds of 0.01, with Japan’s converging at a rate of 0.10.
Africa’s TFP levels have been relatively consistent with the USA over time. This does
not mean that there has been no TFP growth in Africa, but that whatever growth they
have had has been over shadowed by growth in the USA TFP. The convergence speeds in
these four African countries have also been very low, all are less then 0.006.
4.2 Regression Results
Table 5 shows results from equation 27 in the model. It measures the pure eﬀect of learning
on TFP growth over ﬁve year intervals. The ﬁve year time scale is an industry standard
and it is used to minimise disturbances in the data, that is it focuses on longer term trends
ignoring short term ﬂuctuations such as the business cycle. Given that TFP is a residual
the R2 tends to be quite low.
In the global economy analysis, the TFP gap between the USA and all the other coun-
tries has a coeﬃcient of 5.4 per cent on TFP growth. As we have used the industry standard
of a ﬁve-year TFP growth rate, this implies that every ﬁve-years global learning speeds are
about 5.4 per cent. This implies that all countries in the sample are learning at this speed.
However, this pure learning eﬀect is weaker for OECD averages and local leaders.
The next regression tests equation 29 and the results are displayed in Table 6. It tests
whether institutions matter for the speed of learning. The coeﬃcient of the gap (λ) measures
the speed of convergence through learning. By interacting the institution variables with
the gap the indirect eﬀect of these institutions on TFP can be seen, as they works through
learning that is the λ deﬁned in equation 30. The R2 shows that adding the institution
variables to the regression only increases the ﬁt of the model by 2 per cent.
Given that Table 5 claims that each country is learning at 5.4 per cent it is interesting
to see how vastly diﬀerent the learning speeds are once institutions are added. For example
Australia, Austria, Denmark, Belguim, Sweden and Canada all have learning rates greater
then 13 per cent. This imples that they are learning at least twice as much as expected
14without institutions. On the other hand Mali, Senegal, Zambia and Mozambique all have
learning speeds less then 1 per cent. This indicates that there is a huge variation across
countries in the quality of institutions and their eﬀect on that country’s ability to learn.
It can also be seen that the interacted institutions do not have signiﬁcant coeﬃcients,
this is most likely due to the correlation between them. This is not surprising given the
probability of a country only having one good institution indicator is very slim. Therefore
exclusion tests were run on the interacted variables and these tests showed that the variables
are jointly signiﬁcant at the 1 per cent level. These tests shows that institutions clearly
aﬀect the speed of learning which facilitates the catch-up shown in Table 5.
The next step was to determine how much of this convergence is due to the direct eﬀect
of institutions on TFP growth and how much due to the gap. Table 7 shows the results
from equation 32 which indicate that there is a signiﬁcant direct eﬀect on TFP growth by
institutions that is not related to the country’s ability to learn. The R2 are slightly better:
in the case of the USA it increases to 11 per cent, while the OECD and Local Leader
regressions only increase to 9 per cent. However, these ﬁgures may be misleading because
Table 6 and 7 only examine one aspect of the eﬀects of institutions at a time, that is either
the direct or indirect eﬀects.
To address this issue Table 8 shows both the direct and indirect eﬀect of institutions on
TFP growth. It ﬁnds that they both are important though it is diﬃcult to determine which
one is the most inﬂuential. This is because the correlation between the variables change
some of the signs and signiﬁcances when direct and indirect eﬀects are combined. However,
after conditioning on the direct eﬀect, there seems to be less evidence that institutions
matter for learning speeds.
Equations 31 and 34 add country speciﬁc dummy eﬀects to the regression which have
a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the R2 as shown by the joint signiﬁcant test displayed in Table 9.
Country-speciﬁc factors alone account for an R2 ranging from 21 to 28 across regional and
global levels. This indicates that there are systematic country diﬀerences in TFP that do
not seem to have anything to do with institutions. However, once interacted institutions
are added to the dummy variables, as in equation 31, the value of R2 increase, to range
from 24 to 31.
154.3 Implication of Results
There are a number of reasons for these weak results. First TFP is a residual and by its
very nature is diﬃcult to explain. Second, the institutions data are not time varying in
their own right, although this is not a major issue given that implementing new institutions
take time to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect. Third, the regions used are very broad and while there
may be learning at a micro level it does not appear to be transfered to this regional level.
That is a country may be more inclined to learn from a close neighbour or their dominant
trading partner rather then the regional or global TFP leaders.
Also given the strength of the country-speciﬁc factors in explaining TFP growth, it
should be noted that institutions are very diﬃcult to measure and that Acemoglu, Johnson
and Robinson (2001) and Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (2004), stated
this in their respective research.
For robustness these regressions were run using Gross National Product (GNP) rather
then GDP as discussed above and also using hour worked rather then labour in the human
capital estimations. The purpose of using GNP is to test what eﬀect Foreign Direct Invest-
ment (FDI) has on TFP growth. There was practically no diﬀerence at a global level as
would be expected given that global GDP equals global GNP. However there was only a
very small diﬀerence in the regional markets too which would suggest that GNP only really
makes a diﬀerence at a country level. However the impact of FDI is beyond the scope of
this paper.
Substituting hours worked into the regressions could only be done for the 17 European
countries in the dataset. The data was taken from the Groningen Growth and Development
Center but there was not enough coverage of the other regions to analyse them. The overall
growth rates were left relatively unchanged although one or two countries changed position
in their global ordering.
5 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to examine the direct and indirect eﬀects of institutions on
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth. It uses a basic absorption model which measures
a following country’s ability to absorb knowledge and technology from the lead country.
In this paper there are two global leaders, the USA and an average of OECD member
16countries. There are also four regions analysed: Austral-Asia, Europe, The Americas and
the ROW (which includes the Middle-East and Africa). There are no outright leaders in
the regions so the leaders are allowed to vary over time. Indicating that it is possible
for followers to over take leaders depending on which country is more productive at any
particular point in time. The regional leader regression is run over the entire sample with
each country learning form its local leader, this prevents sampling errors.
The gap between the respective leaders and followers is generated using TFP levels.
The larger the gap the further behind the follower is and the more convergence need to
catch-up. The coeﬃcient on the gap, λi measure the fraction of the gap that is closed given
its absorption ability.
The results show that despite the absence of unconditional convergence in the overall
sample data, there appears to be some evidence that there is a tendency for poorer countries
to catch-up with wealthier ones. The rate of this catch-up can be inﬂuenced by the quality
of the country’s institutions. There is both a direct and indirect eﬀect from institutions.
The direct eﬀect on TFP growth comes from the policies set by these institutions, while
the indirect eﬀect is administered through the gap between the leader and the follower.
However these eﬀect are still relatively small.
The most interesting ﬁnding of this research is that country-speciﬁc factors, that are
not picked up by the institution variables used, have the highest explanatory power of all.
This demonstrates that there is still a large random element in cross country TFP growth
rates and convergence rates.
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19Figure 1: Human Capital’s Effect on TFP Growth
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1.050Table 1: Output per Worker: Ratios To U.S. Values
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
USA 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Ireland 0.426 0.498 0.641 0.668 0.881
France 0.622 0.766 0.879 0.907 0.824
Italy 0.536 0.722 0.880 0.841 0.758
UK 0.700 0.681 0.723 0.742 0.734
Canada 0.886 0.848 0.844 0.763 0.743
Hong Kong 0.264 0.409 0.605 0.802 0.750
Japan 0.304 0.542 0.708 0.773 0.664
Argentina 0.624 0.610 0.635 0.407 0.417
Mexico 0.385 0.423 0.494 0.346 0.293
Brazil 0.243 0.274 0.380 0.286 0.231
Romania 0.070 0.107 0.256 0.228 0.163
China 0.026 0.024 0.031 0.053 0.100
India 0.060 0.064 0.069 0.083 0.090
Zimbabwe 0.146 0.153 0.162 0.141 0.109





Austria 0.871 1.013 0.630 1.365
Belgium 0.893 1.012 0.624 1.413
Switzerland 0.810 1.027 0.779 1.011
Denmark 0.752 1.009 0.749 0.995
Spain 0.661 1.008 0.512 1.283
Finland 0.674 1.018 0.754 0.878
France 0.824 1.010 0.595 1.372
U.K. 0.734 0.998 0.678 1.085
Greece 0.478 1.010 0.606 0.782
Ireland 0.881 0.989 0.649 1.374
Italy 0.758 1.012 0.495 1.514
Netherlands 0.845 1.009 0.668 1.254
Norway 0.953 1.012 0.949 0.991
Portugal 0.507 1.004 0.374 1.351
Sweden 0.694 1.009 0.888 0.775
Romania 0.163 1.010 0.693 0.232
Turkey 0.182 0.985 0.369 0.501
AUSTRAL-ASIA
Australia 0.754 1.009 0.798 0.936
China 0.100 0.992 0.418 0.241
Hong Kong 0.750 1.005 0.689 1.083
India 0.090 0.961 0.367 0.255
Indonesia 0.116 0.988 0.364 0.323
Japan 0.664 1.028 0.712 0.907
Korea, Rep 0.456 1.018 0.787 0.570
Malaysia 0.401 0.996 0.557 0.722
New Zealand 0.611 1.008 0.907 0.669
Philippines 0.138 0.979 0.538 0.261
Sri Lanka 0.134 0.971 0.438 0.314
Thailand 0.162 1.020 0.439 0.362





Argentina 0.417 0.994 0.604 0.695
Bolivia 0.107 0.970 0.407 0.272
Brazil 0.231 0.997 0.357 0.648
Canada 0.743 1.008 0.896 0.822
Chile 0.417 0.993 0.558 0.753
Colombia 0.210 0.978 0.379 0.565
Dominican Rep. 0.224 0.965 0.387 0.599
Ecuador 0.164 1.005 0.464 0.353
Jamacia 0.135 1.001 0.390 0.346
Mexico 0.293 0.993 0.477 0.617
Panama 0.280 0.991 0.558 0.506
Peru 0.166 1.000 0.517 0.320
Uruguray 0.356 0.986 0.512 0.705
Venezuela 0.267 0.996 0.411 0.653
AFRICA-MIDDLE EAST
Egypt 0.178 0.941 0.381 0.496
Ghana 0.042 0.945 0.331 0.135
Israel 0.773 1.005 0.667 1.154
Jordan 0.182 0.985 0.520 0.356
Kenya 0.037 0.971 0.331 0.114
Mali 0.032 0.952 0.214 0.156
Mozambique 0.031 0.920 0.227 0.149
Malawi 0.026 0.949 0.274 0.100
Pakistan 0.100 0.971 0.269 0.384
Senegal 0.053 0.940 0.261 0.215
South Africa 0.295 0.962 0.556 0.551
Uganda 0.032 0.902 0.288 0.124
Zambia 0.031 1.006 0.401 0.076
Zimbabwe 0.109 0.984 0.372 0.297
U.S.A. 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000Figure 2: TFP GAP with USA
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2.75Table 4: Pure Learning Eﬀect on TFP Growth
Dependent Variable: Five Year TFP Growth
USA OECD Average Local Leader
Five Yr GAP 0.054*** 0.046*** 0.034***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 2542 2542 2542
R2 0.049 0.038 0.031
Notes:Linear robust regression (Equ. 27). Figures in brackets are standard errors.
Table 5: Interacted Institutions Eﬀect on TFP Growth
Dependent Variable: Five Year TFP Growth
USA OECD Average Local Leaders
Five Yr GAP -0.205 -0.254 -0.366
(0.58) (0.52) (0.37)
Citizens Rights*GAP 0.034 0.053** 0.053**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Health Beneﬁts*GAP -0.101*** -0.110*** -0.045
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Labour Regulation*GAP 0.173 0.187 0.201*
(0.16) (0.15) (0.11)
Labour Regulation Sq*GAP -0.165 -0.185 -0.236*
(0.19) (0.19) (0.13)
Political Government*GAP 0.036** 0.030* 0.009
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
School Enrollment*GAP 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Social Beneﬁts*GAP 0.046 0.048 0.019
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Observations 2542 2542 2542
R2 0.07 0.06 0.06
Notes:Linear robust regression (Equ. 29). Figures in brackets are standard errors.Table 6: Institutions Eﬀect on TFP Growth
Dependent Variable: Five Year TFP Growth
USA OECD Average Local Leaders
Five Yr GAP 0.102*** 0.093*** 0.083***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Citizens Rights 0.080*** 0.078*** 0.073***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Health Beneﬁts -0.075*** -0.072*** -0.073***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Labour Regulation 0.104 0.110 0.137
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Labour Regulation Sq -0.102 -0.118 -0.168
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Political Government 0.009 0.009 0.015**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
School Enrollment 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Social Beneﬁts -0.031** -0.032** -0.035**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 2542 2542 2542
R2 0.11 0.09 0.09
Notes:Linear robust regression (Equ. 32). Figures in brackets are standard errors.Table 7: Interaction and Institutional Eﬀects on TFP Growth
Dependent Variable: Five Year TFP Growth
USA OECD Average Local Leaders
Five Yr GAP -0.048 -0.212 -0.355
(0.55) (0.50) (0.36)
Citizens Rights*GAP -0.049 -0.037 -0.009
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Health Beneﬁts*GAP -0.038 -0.044 -0.011
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Labour Regulation*GAP 0.509*** 0.616*** 0.551**
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17)
Labour Regulation Sq*GAP -0.409** -0.529** -0.512**
(0.20) (0.21) (0.20)
Political Government*GAP 0.034* 0.040** 0.002
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
School Enrollment*GAP -0.000 -0.000* 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Social Beneﬁts*GAP 0.056 0.060* 0.052
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Citizens Rights 0.118*** 0.118*** 0.101***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Health Beneﬁts -0.077*** -0.068** -0.077***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Labour Regulation -0.191* -0.252** -0.327**
(0.11) (0.12) (0.15)
Labour Regulation Sq 0.1473 0.185 0.272
(0.12) (0.13) (0.16)
Political Government 0.006 0.003 0.013
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
School Enrollment 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Social Beneﬁts -0.056*** -0.061*** -0.045**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 2542 2542 2542
R2 0.12 0.10 0.10
Notes: Linear robust regression (Equ. 33). Figures in brackets are standard errors.Table 8: Joint Signiﬁcance test on Institution Variables Global Leaders
Dependent Variable: Five Year TFP Growth
USA
R2 Chi-Squared Signiﬁcance Level
Interaction Institutions (Equ. 29) 0.07 42.97 0.000
Interaction Institutions with Dummies (Equ. 31) 0.31 62.87 0.000
Institutional Levels (Equ. 32) 0.11 156.38 0.000
Levels and Interaction Institutions (Equ. 33) 0.12 198.56 0.000
Country-speciﬁc Dummies (Equ. 34) 0.28 793.92 0.000
OECD Average
R2 Chi-Squared Signiﬁcance Level
Interaction Institutions (Equ. 29) 0.06 42.65 0.000
Interaction Institutions with Dummies (Equ. 31) 0.25 39.62 0.000
Institutional Levels (Equ. 32) 0.09 136.76 0.000
Levels and Interaction Institutions (Equ. 33) 0.11 181.51 0.000
Country-speciﬁc Dummies (Equ. 34) 0.23 675.10 0.000
Local Leader
R2 Chi-Squared Signiﬁcance Level
Interaction Institutions (Equ. 29) 0.06 51.09 0.000
Interaction Institutions with Dummies (Equ. 31) 0.24 54.00 0.000
Institutional Levels (Equ. 32) 0.09 131.42 0.000
Levels and Interaction Institutions (Equ. 33) 0.10 163.39 0.000
Country-speciﬁc Dummies (Equ. 34) 0.21 561.82 0.000APPENDIX 1A: COUNTRIES AND REGIONS
EUROPE AUSTRAL-ASIA
Austria AUT Australia AUS
Belgium BEL China CHN
Switzerland CHE Hong Kong HKG
Denmark DNK India IND
Spain ESP Indonesia IDN
Finland FIN Japan JPN
France FRA Korea, Rep KOR
U.K. GBR Malaysia MYS
Greece GRC New Zealand NZ
Ireland IRL Philippines PHL
Italy ITA Sri Lanka LKA






AMERICAS AFRICA & MIDDLE EAST
Argentina ARG Egypt EGY
Bolivia BOL Ghana GHA
Brazil BRA Israel ISR
Canada CAN Jordan JOR
Chile CHE Kenya KEN
Colombia COL Mali MLI
Dominican Rep. DOM Mozambique MOZ
Ecuador ECU Malawi MWI
Jamacia JAM Pakistan PAK
Mexico MEX Senegal SEN
Panama PAN South Africa ZAF
Peru PER Uganda UGA
Uruguray URY Zambia ZMB
Venezuela VEN Zimbabwe ZWEAPPENDIX 1B: PENN WORLD TABLES VARIBLES
Variable Unit Deﬁnition
POP 000’S Population
XRAT US=1 Exchange Rate
cgdp $ current Real Gross Domestic Product per capita (current prices)
cc % Consumption share of CGDP
ci % Investment share of CGDP
cg % Government share of CGDP
p US=100 Price Level of GDP (current prices)
pc ppp/xrate Price Level of Consumption (current prices)
pg ppp/xrate Price Level of Government (current prices)
pi ppp/xrate Price Level of Investment (current prices)
openc % Openness (current prices)
cgnp % Ratio of GNP to GDP (current price)
csave % Current Savings
rgdpl $ constant Real GDP per capita (constant prices: Laspeyres)
rgdpch $ chain Real GDP per capita (constant prices: Chain series)
rgdpeqa $ eq. Adult Real GDP chain per equivalent adult
rgdpwok $ worker Real GDP chain per worker
rgdptt $ terms of trade Real Domestic Income (RGDPL adj. for Terms of Trade changes)
openk % Openness (constant prices)
kc % Consumption share of RGDPL
kg % Government share of RGDPL
ki % Investment share of RGDPLAPPENDIX 1C: NEW VARIBLES CREATED FROM PWT
Variable Unit Deﬁnition Equation
Y $ chain Total Domestic Output; RGDPCH by Population
pop∗1000∗rgdpch
1,000,000
trgdpl $ constant Total Domestic Output; RGDPL by Population
pop∗1000∗rgdpl
1,000,000
L 000’s Labour Force
trgdpl∗1,000,000)/rgdpwok
1000
INVST $ constant Investment ( ki
100) ∗ trgdpl
cgnp2 $ current Gross National Product (current Prices)
cgdp∗cgnp
100
deﬂator - Deﬂator used in GDP chain linking base yr 2000
cgdp
rgdpch
rgnpch $ chain Real Gross National Product (chain series)
cgnp
deflator
trgnpch $ chain Total National Output; RGNPCH by population
pop∗1000∗rgnpch
1,000,000APPENDIX 1D: SHLEIFER’S INSTITUTIONS VARIABLES
Variable Deﬁnition and Source
Political Government
Government eﬀectiveness This variable measures the quality of public service provision. Glaeser et.al.(2004)
Executive constraints A measure of the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision making powers of
chief executives. Botero et.al.(2004)
Citizens Rights
Expropriation risk Risk of “outright conﬁscation and forced nationalization” of property. Glaeser et.al.(2004)
Corruption Corruption perception index for 1999. Djankov et.al.(2002)
Civil Rights Combination of two measurements Civil right index from Djankov et.al.(2002) and Botero et.al.(2004)
Property Rights Property rights of citizens. Djankov et.al.(2002)
Court Index Combination of two court formalism index - collection of bounced cheque and
eviction non-paying tenants. Botero et.al(2004)
Labour Regulations
Alternative contract Index Measures the existence and cost of alternatives to the standard contract. Botero et.al.(2004)
Male(Female) Participation Male(Female) participation rate as a percentage of the total male(female) population
aged 15 to 64. Botero et.al (2004)
Minimum Age Measures the age at which a child can be employed in an apprenticeship or in a full-time,
non-farm, non-hazardous, non-night time job outside of the family business. Botero et.al.(2004)
Minimum Wage Measure the minimum mandatory wage. Botero et.al.(2004)
Labour Index Measures the protection of labor and employment laws as the average of:(1) Alternative
employment contracts; (2) Cost of increasing hours worked; (3) Cost of ﬁring workers;
and (4) Dismissal procedures. Botero et.al (2004)
Health Beneﬁts
Response Responsiveness of the health system. Djankov et.al (2002)
ISO ave Combination of ISO environmental and quality standards. Djankov et.al (2002)
Sick index Measures the level of sickness and health beneﬁt. Botero et.al (2004)
Population at risk of malaria Percentage of the population at risk of malaria transmission in 1994. Glaeser et.al.(2004)
% Population in Percentage of a country’s population in Koeppen-Geiger temperate zone in 1995.
temperate zone Glaeser et.al. (2004)
Social Beneﬁts
Industrial Index Measures the protection of collective relations laws as the average of: (1) Labor union power
and (2) Collective disputes. Botero et.al (2004)
Social security index Measures social security beneﬁts as the average of: (1) Old age, disability and death beneﬁts;
(2) Sickness and health beneﬁts; and (3) Unemployment beneﬁts. Botero et.al.(2004)